Abstract: Significant differences exist between official Chinese and U.S. trade statistics on the magnitudes of the China-U.S. trade balance in goods as well as in goods and services. These differences arise from a number of factors. First, the convention that exports of goods are measured on an FOB (free on board) or FAS (free alongside ship) basis and imports on a CIF (cost, insurance and freight) basis means that the value of imported goods as measured by the importing nation is always higher than the same goods as measured by the exporting nation.
Introduction
Significant differences exist between official Chinese and U.S. trade statistics on the magnitudes of the China-U.S. trade balance in goods as well as in goods and services. These differences arise from a number of factors. First, the convention that exports of goods are measured on an FOB (free on board) or FAS (free alongside ship) basis and imports on a CIF (cost, insurance and freight) basis means that the value of imported goods as measured by the importing nation is always higher than the same goods as measured by the exporting nation.
Thus, Chinese exports of goods to the U.S. according to Chinese official statistics is always less than U.S. imports of goods from China according to U.S. official statistics, by approximately 10 percent, the CIF/FOB factor. Second, Chinese exports of goods to the U.S.
according to Chinese official statistics include only direct exports to the U.S. but not reexports to the U.S. through Hong Kong, whereas U.S. imports of goods from China according to U.S. official statistics include Chinese re-exports through Hong Kong because the U.S. applies its rules of origin with regard to imports. Third, similarly, U.S. exports of goods to China according to U.S. official statistics do not include re-exports of U.S. goods to China through Hong Kong. Fourth, the increasingly important trade in services between China and the U.S. are often not included. However, only the U.S. publishes data on trade in services between the two nations, which show that the U.S. has a persistent, significant and positive trade balance in services. In what follows, we attempt to adjust both the Chinese and the U.S. official data for the effects of these four factors and derive the corresponding estimate of the China-U.S. trade balance.
Finally, even the most accurately measured trade balance based on the gross value of exports of goods and services from each nation is not a reliable indicator of the relative benefit that each nation derives from the bilateral trade. The real benefit that exports bring to an economy is the value-added (GDP) that it generates, and not its gross value (and employment). Thus a more appropriate measure of the relative benefit is the trade balance in terms of value-added. In this paper, we also present estimate of the domestic value-added (equivalent to GDP) generated by each nation from their exports to each other. This estimate is based the value-added coefficients derived in a comprehensive study conducted by Prof.
Xikang CHEN and his research collaborators at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. In terms of value added, the China-U.S. trade balance is further reduced as the domestic value-added content of Chinese exports is significantly less than the domestic value-added content of U.S. exports to China. However, even with all these adjustments, the China-U.S. trade balance remains a significant large number in China's favor.
In Table 1 we present official Chinese and U.S. trade statistics on their bilateral trade in their original forms in Billion U.S. Dollars, including the respective implied bilateral trade balances, from 1989 to 2015. Table 1 shows that large discrepancies between the official Chinese and U.S. data still exist. In 2015, official Chinese data indicate Chinese exports to the U.S. (free on board (FOB)) to be US$409.2 billion compared to the official U.S. figure billion according to Chinese data and US$367.4 billion according to U.S. data, a huge discrepancy. Fortunately, the discrepancies in the trade data seem to be narrowing over time.
For example, the discrepancy in Chinese exports to the U.S. has declined from 63% in 1989 to 15% in 2015; the discrepancy in Chinese imports from the U.S. has declined from 36% to 27%; and the discrepancy in the China-U.S. trade balance has declined from a high of 75% in 1995 to 29% in 2015. It is our objective to try to reconcile the official Chinese and U.S.
estimates of the China-U.S. trade and narrow the discrepancies in the estimates of the bilateral trade balance through adjustments of the differences in concepts and definitions. world exports of all nations will always be less than total world imports of all nations, which is not possible. Moreover, since the insurance and freight services are frequently not provided by the exporting country, it is misleading to include their costs as part of that country's exports. The results, based on the official data on the exports of goods of both China and the U.S., are presented in Table 2 . Table 2 shows that by relying only on the export data of both countries, the estimated China-U.S. trade balance is higher than the official Chinese figure and lower than the office U.S. figure Note: Conversion from an FAS to an FOB basis through the multiplication by the factor 1.01. 
Adjustment for the Re-Exports through Hong Kong
Next, we adjust the China-U.S. bilateral trade data for the re-exports through Hong
Kong. The official re-exports data through Hong Kong are presented in Table 3 . Chinese reexports to the U.S. are further adjusted by the division by the customarily assumed CIF/FOB factor of 1.1 to arrive at the FOB China values. U.S. re-exports to China through Hong Kong are also similarly adjusted. 2 It is believed that mark-up adjustments for re-exports through Hong Kong are not necessary, as most of the mark-ups of Chinese re-exports to the U.S.
through Hong Kong have probably been actually earned on the Mainland but booked in Hong
Kong for tax purposes. The values declared by the re-exporters of Chinese goods to the U.S.
through Hong Kong actually reflect more closely the true values of the Chinese exports.
Similarly, the mark-ups (or mark-downs) of U.S. re-exports to China through Hong Kong may be for exchange control or tariff avoidance purposes. A comparison of Table 1 and Table 3 reveals that re-exports through Hong Kong have declined significantly in recent years. Chinese re-exports to the U.S. through Hong Kong have declined from its peak of 196% of direct exports to the U.S. in 1991 to only 8% in 2015. Similarly, U.S. re-exports to China through Hong Kong has declined from its peak of 44% in 1996 to only 7% in 2015.
Thus, an adjustment for the mark-ups would not have made much difference in any case.
In Table 4 , the re-exports are added back to the official Chinese and U.S. export data to arrive at the total Chinese and U.S. exports of goods to each other on an FOB basis. With the adjustment for re-exports through Hong Kong, the estimate of the China-U.S. trade balance is increased from US$291.3 billion to US$317.4 billion.
2 A possible alternative estimate of the CIF/FOB factor is the ratio of the total value of Chinese imports of goods into Hong Kong according to Hong Kong data to the total value of Chinese exports to Hong Kong according to Chinese data. Similarly, a possible alternative estimate of the CIF/FOB factor for the adjustment of the reexports of U.S. goods from Hong Kong to the Mainland is the ratio of the total value of U.S. imports of goods into Hong Kong according to Hong Kong data to the total value of U.S. exports to Hong Kong according to the U.S. data. Unfortunately, these ratios show implausibly large values for certain years and cannot really be used for this purpose. In Table 5 , we attempt to reconcile our estimate of the total Chinese exports to the U.S., including re-exports through Hong Kong, converted into a CIF basis, with the official U.S. data on U.S. imports from China (CIF). They show that the re-exports adjustment greatly reduce the discrepancy between the Chinese and the U.S. official data (compare columns 8 and 9). In particular, the discrepancy was less than 2 percent for the five-year period from 2011 to 2015. We attribute any remaining discrepancy between our adjusted estimates, CIF, and the U.S. official data to possible re-exports of Chinese goods to the U.S.
through other third countries and regions than Hong Kong and the possible under-invoicing of imports by U.S. importers for the avoidance of tariffs. In Table 6 , we attempt to reconcile our estimate of the total U.S. exports to China (FOB) after the adjustment for re-exports through Hong Kong with the official Chinese data on Chinese imports from the U.S. (CIF). Table 6 Kong. Once re-exports through Hong Kong are added back to the U.S. exports on a CIF basis, to arrive at our estimates of the total Chinese imports from the U.S., CIF (column 7), they become greater than the official Chinese data (column 8) for every year from 1990 to 2012. However, from 2013 to 2015, the imports from the U.S. according to the official Chinese data are still higher even though they are actually quite close, on the order of 5 percent. We attribute the remaining discrepancy between our estimates and the Chinese official data to possible re-exports of U.S. goods through other third countries and regions 
Official Data on Trade in Services
The U.S. publishes bilateral data on trade in services. Unfortunately, China does not currently publish such data. The values of the bilateral trade in services between China and the U.S., based on U.S. official data, are presented in Table 7 below. Bilateral trade in services was in approximate balance in 2006, at an annual rate of US$10 billion each way.
Since then, U.S. exports of services to China has grown rapidly, to US$48.4 billion in 2015, compared to Chinese exports of services to the U.S. of US$15.1 billion, resulting in a surplus of US$33.3 billion for the U.S. However, fragmentary Chinese data suggest that the U.S.
3 But not for the avoidance of import tariff purposes. 
Domestic Value-Added Generated by Exports of Goods and Services
The gross value of exports is not a reliable measure of the benefits to the exporting country. For example, while most of the Apple i-phones are assembled in China, the valueadded in China is no more than US$20 for each i-phone assembled in China even though it is exported for approximately US$500 with a value-added to gross value ratio of 4%. What is more useful as an indicator of the benefit for the exporting country is the domestic valueadded (or equivalently, the GDP) generated directly and indirectly by the exports. Prof.
Xikang CHEN and his collaborators at the Chinese Academy of Sciences have estimated the value-added corresponding to the exports of goods and services of both China and the U.S. in 2015 by using input-occupancy-output tables of both countries, adapting a methodology similar to that used in Chen et al (2006 Chen et al ( , 2009 Chen et al ( , 2012 and Lau et al (2007) . The results are summarized in Table 9 
Concluding Remarks
The differences between the official Chinese and U.S. trade data have been largely reconciled by using only export data on an FOB basis, even though small differences still exist (see Tables 5 and 6 above) . What are some of the possible reasons for the existence of remaining discrepancies between the Chinese and U.S. trade data? First, there can be differences between departure and arrival dates, so that the exports from one country in one year may be recorded as imports in the following year by the other country. If exports have been increasing or decreasing rapidly, the discrepancies can be quite noticeable. However, these discrepancies can account for at most a month or two of the year's exports and should normalize afterwards. Second, the actual FOB-CIF adjustments may not be the same as what we have implicitly assumed because the insurance and freight costs may be asymmetric between shipping from China to U.S. and from U.S. to China. Third, there may be overinvoicing and under-invoicing by exporters, importers and re-exporters for various reasons such as avoidance of capital control, tax on profits and import tariffs.
Unfortunately, Chinese official data on bilateral trade in services are not available.
Based on the U.S. data on bilateral trade in services, the China-U.S. trade balance in goods and services combined in terms of value-added in 2015 may be estimated to be US$145.0 billion. Based on fragmentary Chinese data on trade in services, the China-U.S. trade balance in terms of value-added in 2015 may be estimated to be US$132.7 billion. While these numbers are still large and significant, they represent very large reductions from the estimate based on official U.S. gross value of trade in goods data of US$367.4 billion for 2015 (see Table 1 ).
One stream of service payments received by the U.S. beneficially but which may not be reflected in the bilateral trade in services data are the "royalties and license fees" paid to subsidiaries of U.S. firms such as Apple and Qualcomm that are domiciled in third countries and regions such as Ireland or Netherlands Antilles and not repatriated to the U.S. They will show up in the trade data as an export of services from these third countries to China instead of from the U.S. to China. These amounts are substantial and their domestic value-added content is close to 100 percent. If they can be identified and properly included in the estimation, the China-U.S trade balance in terms of value-added will be even further reduced.
